We study how the strategies and performance of an asset management company are affected by its internal organizational structure. Relying on Stein's (2002) theory of organizations, we argue that a more hierarchical structure reduces the incentives to collect "soft" information and to engage in proximity investment. This should lower portfolio concentration, increase managerial herding and reduce performance. We use information on the organizational structure of all the US mutual funds and insurance-managed funds investing in US corporate bonds. We show that more hierarchical structures invest less in firms located close to them and deliver lower performance. An additional layer in the hierarchical structure reduces the average performance by 24 basis points per month. At the same time, more hierarchical structures tend to herd more and to hold less concentrated portfolios. We also find that changes in fund structure quickly find their way into the behavior of fund managers. Overall, the organizational structure affects performance slightly more for mutual funds than insurance-managed funds, while it impacts proximity investment, herding and portfolio concentration more for insurance-managed funds than mutual funds.
Introduction
The mainstream literature on mutual funds has devoted scarce attention to the way the management company is structured and how this structure affects investment strategies and performance. Instead, the focus has been primarily on the "human drivers" of performance.
Managerial ability and information, compensation structure, trading costs and family affiliation have been thoroughly investigated. Only recently, the focus has been extended to more organizational issues such as whether a fund is managed by a team or a single manager (Bar et al., 2005 , Massa et al., 2005 and whether management has been outsourced (Chen et al., 2005 , Del Guercio et al., 2007 .
However, the broader question of how the internal organizational structure of the fund affects its strategies and performance has not yet been fully explored. Let us consider a stylized case. A fund is organized as a multi-layer hierarchical ("vertical") structure. At the top there is the CEO of the fund, below the Head of Fixed Income and below the Portfolio Manager. Do we expect this structure to deliver better performance than a flatter one consisting of just one portfolio manager?
A more vertical structure lends itself to better risk management by helping reduce managerial moral hazard and lowering the incentives to take (un)necessary risk. However, a more vertical structure, by reducing the discretion of the portfolio manager, also lowers his incentives to collect difficult-to-transfer information ("soft information") -i.e., the one based on direct personal interaction with the managers of the firm (Stein, 2002 ) -and to engage in proximity investment.
In the asset management industry performance is positively related to the collection of soft information on the firms located close-by (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and 2001 , Chen et al., 2004 . Therefore, more vertical structures, by reducing proximity investment and collection of information, should deliver worse performance. Moreover, by forcing the "codification" of the information passed-on to the superiors and by reducing the direct attribution of the fund performance to the portfolio managers, a vertical structure would increase the incentives of the manager to herd with the other fund managers. Both higher herding and more limited collection of soft information should make more hierarchical funds have less concentrated portfolios.
These observations suggest the existence of a relation between organizational structure and investment strategies and performance. In this paper, we study these factors by focusing on two main players of the asset management industry: the mutual funds and the funds managed by insurance companies (both life insurance and property and damage insurance). We use information on portfolio composition, performance as well as organizational structure of all the US mutual funds and insurance-managed funds investing in US corporate bonds (the "funds"). For each fund we have information on its organizational structure. We know the identity, the functions and the roles of all the members of the management team. Each member is characterized in terms of his functional attributions (e.g., Chairman, CEO, CFO, Fixed Income Head, Portfolio Manager, Trader, Analyst) as well as his areas of competence (e.g., market sector, credit sector, geographical focus). This allows us to construct a measure of organizational structure: "hierarchy". Hierarchy is defined in terms of the number of layers, from the top down, in which the organization is structured. For example, a structure presided by the CEO, with a fixed income head and two portfolio managers has a hierarchy equal to 3. This also allows us to control for the potential confounding effects due to heterogeneity in the degree of specialty, qualification, competence of functional attribution existing within the structure.
We start by focusing on the determinants of the organizational structure. If the overall objective of the financial family managing the fund (mutual fund family or insurance family) is not limited to performance maximization, but is also geared to risk/managerial moral hazard control, we can explain the choice of hierarchy on the basis of the characteristics of the financial family the fund belongs to. This lets us identify the exogenous determinants of fund hierarchy.
We then relate hierarchy to proximity investment. We show that more hierarchical structures tend to invest less in firms located close to them. An additional layer in the structure increases the average holdings-weighted manager-bond distance by 6%. At the same time, hierarchy increases the tendency to herd more and to hold less concentrated portfolios. An additional layer in hierarchy increases herding by 16% and reduces portfolio concentration by 48%.
This has a direct impact on performance: more vertical structures display worse performance.
An additional layer in hierarchy reduces the average performance by 24 basis points per month.
Overall, the organizational structure affects performance slightly more for mutual funds than insurance firms, while it impacts proximity investment, herding and portfolio concentration more for insurance companies than mutual funds. These findings indicate that the organizational structure is important in determining asset management strategies as well as performance. This is broadly consistent with Stein's (2002) theory of organizations.
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. First, we relate to the recent literature on the choice between team and sole management as well as the one between internal performance generation and outsourcing. Massa et al. (2005) show that the choice between team and managers is a mere marketing strategy, while Baer et al., (2005) argue that teams have a production technology that differs from that of single managers. Chen et al. (2005) and Del Guercio et al. (2007) investigate the effects of outsourcing on the incentives and performance of mutual funds, showing that funds managed externally significantly under-perform those run internally. We complement these findings by focusing on the overall organizational structure of the funds.
Moreover, our analysis is not limited to the mutual fund industry but also focuses on the insurance industry. This is, to our knowledge, the first paper that also analyzes the strategies and performance of the insurance companies and directly compares them to the mutual funds. Also, we focus on a hitherto relatively unexplored area: the funds specialized in corporate bonds.
Second, we relate to the vast literature on mutual fund performance. Its goal has been to determine whether it is possible to identify some measures that identify consistently overperforming funds (e.g., Brown and Goetzmann, 1995 , Elton, et al., 1996 , Carhart, 1997 . Our paper contributes to this literature by presenting evidence for one of the drivers of fund performance -the fund organizational structure. Again, our findings have bearings not only for the mutual fund industry but for the overall asset management industry, including the insurance one.
Third, we relate to the literature on proximity investment (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 , 2001 , Chen et al., 2004 . Our findings help to explain the positive relationship between proximity investment and performance already documented in the mutual fund literature by showing that one of the important factors that induce some funds to invest in close-by bonds is the organizational structure of the fund.
Fourth, we relate to the literature on herding. Lakonishok et al. (1992) , Grinblatt et al. (1995) and Wermers (1999) document herding among pension fund and mutual fund managers. We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we provide evidence of herding for the insurance companies and in the bond market. Second and more importantly, we show how the organizational structure of the fund affects herding.
Finally, we relate to the literature on the economics of mutual fund families. Nanda et al. (2004) document the positive spillover that having a 'star' fund provides to all the funds belonging to the same family and the strategies played by the families to generate star funds. Khorana and Servaes (1999) study the determinants of mutual fund stars, while Mamaysky and Spiegel (2001) provide a first equilibrium model of the mutual fund industry, arguing that families generate funds to allow investors to overcome their hedging needs. More recently, Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2004) show that performance persists at the family level, especially large fund families, suggesting that families purposefully allocate resources across funds in an unequal way, while Gaspar et al. (2004) provide evidence of cross-fund subsidization at the family level. We contribute by explaining the organizational structure of the fund with the characteristics of the family the fund belongs to.
Moreover, we extend the definition and analysis of "family coordination" to the families of insurance-managed funds. This is, to our knowledge, the first paper to tackle this topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our main hypotheses and the empirical approach. Section III discusses the data and provides summary statistics. Section IV presents the empirical results. A brief conclusion follows.
Main Hypotheses and Empirical Approach
To study the link between organizational structure and strategies, we loosely rely on Stein's (2002) model of organizations. The model posits that different structures perform differently in terms of generating information about investment projects and allocating capital to these projects. Vertical hierarchies make it more difficult to transfer information and tend to bureaucratically produce the wrong kind of information. Therefore, hierarchical structures are better in the case of hard information, while flat structures are better in the case of soft information. "A decentralized approach -with small, single-manager firms -is most likely to be attractive when information about projects is "soft" and cannot be credibly transmitted. In contrast, large hierarchies perform better when information can be costlessly "hardened" and passed along inside the firm." Evidence of this has been found in the banking industry, with small banks better able to collect and act on soft information than large ones (Berger et al., 2005) .
In the case of the asset management industry, we observe different degrees of hierarchy across management firms. This is even more true if we consider different classes of asset managers such as mutual funds and insurance companies. The heterogeneity is greater for mutual funds than life insurance and property and damage insurance companies.
We argue that the choice of the structure is affected by the overall objectives of the firm and it is not limited to performance maximization -i.e., profits maximization in Stein's model -but also geared to risk/managerial moral hazard control. While these are outside of Stein's model, they are likely to shape the decision of the mutual fund family. A more hierarchical structure allows a better control of managerial behavior. By making it necessary to "codify" the information passedon to the superior, a vertical structure may enhance the effectiveness of risk management.
These considerations suggest the existence of an optimal degree of hierarchy within each asset management organization that is dictated by the trade-off between performance and risk management. While we cannot observe what drives the specific optimum for each mutual fund or insurance family, we can use family specific characteristics to explain (instrument) the level of hierarchy of the funds belonging to the family and then relate it to observable fund policies. In particular, we will focus on three policies: proximity investment, portfolio concentration and herding and their relation to performance.
We start with proximity investment. The asset management industry relies on both hard and soft information. The former is related to information about macro-variables as well as objective fundamentals of the value of the firm. It is easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways. The latter is more related to the less tangible information that the asset manager collects by interacting with the managers of the firm (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001) . Indeed, given that soft information is based on direct personal interaction, it is mostly related to investment in close-by companies. We therefore expect the structures more likely to engage in proximity investment to be the less hierarchical ones. This defines our first restriction. H1: Less hierarchical structures invest more in closely-located companies. Stein (2002) posits that, in the case of soft information, the advantage of decentralization relative to hierarchy is high-powered research incentives. Indeed, managers are more motivated to generate information if they can directly act on it (and be remunerated accordingly). We also know that the availability of more information induces the manager to tilt his portfolio towards the set of assets over which he has more information. Evidence of this has been found by Kacperczyk et al (2005) who document a positive relation between portfolio concentration and information for mutual funds. We therefore argue that managers in less hierarchical structures tend to hold more concentrated portfolios. This allows us to define our second restriction.
H2: Less hierarchical structures display a higher degree of portfolio concentration.
A more vertical structure makes it necessary to "codify" the information passed-on to the superiors and reduces the direct attribution of performance to the portfolio manager. This reduces the incentives to collect information, makes the managers more likely to adopt more "conventional" investment behavior, and translates in higher herding with other investment managers. This defines our third restriction.
H3: Less hierarchical structures herd less.
Finally, we consider the implication for performance. The existing literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2004) suggests that funds investing in close firms -i.e., funds specialized in soft information -tend to outperform their peers. A more hierarchical structure lowers the incentives to collect soft information and to invest in geographically close assets -the ones more likely to provide superior performance (Chen et al., 2004) . Both effects concur to reduce performance. This defines our final restriction.
H4: Less hierarchical structures outperform their peers.
It is worth noting that we will focus on bond funds. Recent findings have discovered evidence of proximity investment also for this class of assets. Massa et al., (2007) document the existence of local bias and proximity investment in bond investing by both mutual funds and insurance companies. This happens on a scale similar if not greater than in the case of equity. In the case of bonds, soft information is mostly about financial conditions and distress of the firm, as opposed to movements in the government yield curve. We will see that this is confirmed in our findings as most of the performance benefits of a flatter organizational structure -i.e., the one more related to the collection of soft information and proximity investment -are concentrated in the investment in low quality bonds.
Data, Construction of Main Variables and Summary Statistics
The main dataset is the Lipper's eMAXX fixed income database. eMAXX contains details of fixed income holdings for nearly 20,000 U.S. and European insurance companies-managed funds, U.S., Canadian and European mutual funds, and U.S. public pension funds. It provides information on quarterly ownership of more than 40,000 fixed-income issuers with $5.4 trillion in total fixed income par amount from the first quarter of 1998 to the second quarter of 2005. Moreover, it has detailed information on the structure of the fund managing entity, including the functions, roles, competences and areas of specialty of its members. The accuracy of the Lipper data (the part on mutual funds) has been double checked using CRSP mutual funds and Morningstar. In our analysis, we will mostly focus on the behavior of funds managed by either mutual fund families or insurance companies. We will also consider a residual category that includes public pension funds and variable annuities. In the case of mutual funds, we focus on the fund, aggregating the holdings of its different classes (i.e., A, B, C, ..). In the case of insurance-managed funds we analyze them in aggregate as well as we separately consider life insurance and property and damage insurance funds.
This allows us to control for the differences in constraints and goals of these different managing entities.
We start by defining our proxy for the degree of hierarchy. Hierarchy is defined as the distinct number of layers of the structure of the fund. We consider 6 layers. The first layer is made of the Chairman, President and CEO; the second layer is made of the CFO and CIO; the third layer is We also consider a set of control variables. We start with a variable that controls for the degree of "employee specialty". This proxies for the number of "competences" represented in the organization. We want to separate the effect of hierarchy from the fact that funds are managed by experts in many fields. Indeed, the degree of specialty of the asset managers may directly affect performance. A higher degree of employee specialty affects managerial behavior. It increases the ability to beat the peers and potentially discourages herding. Also, the presence of different areas number of total combinations of the above four sectors. Finally, we define the number of specialties as the number of total combinations of the above four sectors. We define employee specialty as the number of specialties divided by the number of employees. Therefore, our proxy of specialty controls for heterogeneity in the degree of specialty, qualification, competence of functional attribution existing within the structure.
Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table I , Panel A1. Hierarchy ranges between 1 and 4 1 and on average is higher for mutual funds than for insurance funds. Employee specialty ranges between 0.5 and 7 and is higher for insurance funds. If we consider the overall sample, we see that the number of single hierarchy funds is way greater than that of multiple hierarchy funds. That is, in the sample there is a big imbalance in favor of one-layer funds. This may be a concern if it implies a lack of cross-sectional variation within the hierarchy variable. To address this issue, we resort to a matching sample technique, where, for each multi-hierarchy fund, we match it with some other single-hierarchy fund similar in terms of fund type (if insurance or mutual fund) and size, but different in terms of fund structure.
We construct two matching samples, one within fund family and one across fund families. Both matching samples are more balanced in terms of fund hierarchy. Each one of the two matching procedures has some advantages. By matching within fund family, we have better control for the unobserved common -presumably collected at the family level -information set of fund managers, and for the potential coordinated behavior among funds of the same family (e.g., "cross-fund subsidization"). Indeed, one other concern may be the fact that our analysis does not directly control for some unobserved fund/family characteristics. However, matching within fund family may not deliver the best match in terms of fund size, liquidity or other characteristics (Chen et.al., 2004) . Matching across fund families (within the same fund type), instead, allows us to better control for size-related fund characteristics. We therefore jointly use these two matches as a way of guaranteeing the robustness of our results.
The "matching within fund family" sample is constructed as follows. For each multi-hierarchy fund, we first select another single hierarchy fund from the same fund family and most similar in terms of fund size, and then we combine the matched single hierarchy funds with the original multi-hierarchy funds. The "matching across fund family" sample is constructed similarly except that the matched single-hierarchy fund is chosen from different fund families but belonging to the same fund type (mutual funds, insurance companies, etc.).
We provide descriptive statistics of the different samples. Panel A1 is based on the full sample, while Panel A2 and Panel A3 are for the matching sample within and across fund families respectively. The number of observations (fund-quarter) is given in the parentheses. We report all the institutions as well as separately report the results for funds owned by life insurance companies, mutual funds, property insurance companies and other institutions (annuities and pension funds).
It is interesting to note that, mutual funds in general are more likely to have a higher degree of hierarchy than funds owned by life insurance companies, but they have a lower degree of employee specialty. Funds owned by property insurance companies have even less hierarchical structures than life insurance companies. This may reflect the fact that property insurance companies are in general smaller, even if it is also true that the size of funds owned by mutual funds is smaller than that of life insurance companies.
Overall, the statistics suggest that hierarchy is not only related to the size of the fund, but it also changes with the characteristics of the asset management firm. This will provide crosssectional variation for our tests and will help us explain the choice of hierarchy and employee specialty on the basis of the characteristics of the financial family the fund belongs to. This lets us identify the exogenous components of hierarchy and employee specialty.
Next we describe our main control variables. To control for portfolio turnover, we construct a measure that captures how frequently a fund rotates its portfolio. Let us denote the set of bond issues held by fund i by Q. The turnover ratio of fund i at quarter t is:
represent the return and the par amount of bond issue k held by investor i at quarter t. This definition follows those commonly used to assess overall equity portfolio rotation (Barber and Odean, 2000, Gaspar et al., 2005) .
To control for the effect due to the existence of a team as opposed to a sole portfolio manager (Ruenzi, 2005 , Massa et al., 2005 , we define a team dummy. This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund has more than 1 portfolio managers and 0 otherwise.
The return of the fund is constructed as the cumulative monthly fund return during each quarter. Fund monthly return refers to the raw return from its bond portfolio. The data on bond returns are obtained from Bloomberg. For the case of the mutual funds, we also use the CRSP return data. The results do not differ from the ones we report. The volatility of the fund returns is defined as follows. For each fund at month t, we calculate return volatility as the standard deviation of monthly returns in the prior 20 months.
We also include variables meant to capture fund size and family size. They are the logarithm of the par-amount of bond holdings of each fund (fund family). To alleviate the concern that part of the investment purpose of the insurance companies is asset-liability matching, we include a variable representing fund portfolio maturity. It is the logarithm of the value-weighted average maturity of all the bonds held by each fund. To control for location effects, we include a Financial Center Dummy. It takes a value of 1 if the fund is located at either of the following cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston and San Francisco.
Finally, we also control for the fraction invested by the fund in investment-grade bonds. This is defined as the fraction invested in investment-grade bonds with S&P's bond rating not below BBB.
The detailed definitions of these variables can also be found in the Appendix. We report the summary statistics of the control variables in Panel B of Table I . In general, funds run by life insurance companies have larger size, lower turnover ratio and higher portfolio maturity than those of funds owned by mutual fund families.
With the measure of organizational structure and other control variables at hand, our next step is to see the impact of fund hierarchy on portfolio strategies and fund performance. In particular, we will look at fund proximity investing, portfolio concentration and herding. We briefly report the summary statistics of those variables in Panel B of Table I . The detailed definitions of these variables are given in the next section as well as in the Appendix.
Empirical Results
We start our analysis with the relation between organizational structure and proximity investing.
Then, we link it to portfolio concentration and herding. Finally, we focus on how the organizational structure affects fund performance.
A. Organizational Structure and Proximity Investing
Restriction H1 posits that funds characterized by a less hierarchical structure invest more in closely-located companies. For each fund, we define its distance from the firms whose bonds it holds ( t i Dis , ). It measures the distance between the fund and its bond portfolio. If we denote the set of bond issues held by fund i by Q and
be the fraction invested in bond issue j, the fundbond distance is:
lon ) are the (latitude, longitude) for fund i and bond issuer j in radian degrees.
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We start with some univariate analysis. We report the results in Table II , Panel A. We break down the sample into 4 different levels of hierarchy: from the lowest (1 layer) to the highest (4 layers). We then report the sample mean of fund portfolio distance at different levels of fund hierarchy. The number of observations appears in parenthesis. We report the results for the original sample and the two matching samples described earlier. We also provide univariate tests of fund portfolio distance regarding to single vs. multi-fund hierarchy. Multi-hierarchy means the number of fund hierarchies is greater than 1. The results show a monotonic increase in fund portfolio distance as the number of layers increases. This holds regardless of the sample. A fourlayer fund tends to invest in bonds of firms on average 240 (175 and 210) km further away than a one-layer fund in the case of the overall sample (sample based on matching within family and sample based on matching across families).
We now move on to the multivariate analysis. We estimate:
where
Dis , represents the fund-bond distance of fund i at quarter t,
Hierarchy is fund hierarchy and
is the vector made of the other control variables defined above. We add the fund type dummies across all specifications.
We report the results in Table II , Panel B for the entire sample. In Panels C and D, the sample is based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively. We include funds owned by life insurance companies, mutual funds, property insurance companies and other institutions (annuities and pension funds). Column (1) reports the results from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at fund level.
To address the possible endogeneity of fund structures, in Column (2), we implement an IV regression, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. We instrument fund structure variables using the following variables: family hierarchy (median of fund hierarchy within a family), family employee specialty (median of employee specialty within a family), family team (median of team dummy within a family), the interaction of family hierarchy with a financial center dummy and the interaction of family employee specialty with a financial center dummy.
This latter variable resembles the instrument used by Chen et al. (2005) for the degree of outsourcing. The intuition is the following. We know that the location in a financial center will have a direct impact on proximity investment and performance, while the interaction with the structure of the family needs not be so. At the same time, the interaction with the structure of the family helps to explain the structure of the fund. Indeed, the incentive of the management family to include many layers or many different areas of specialty depends on the availability of people.
Availability is higher in financial centers than in rural areas. Therefore, the desire of the family to set up a specific structure is constrained by the location of the fund.
(Unreported) results show that the instruments help explain the organizational structure. Also, they do not affect the dependent variable in the second stage through a channel different from the impact on the instrumented variable. At the bottom of each IV specification we report the Hansen's J statistic (p-value). It always fails to reject the null, providing evidence for the quality of our instruments.
As additional robustness check, In Column (3), we provide Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while in Column (4), we provide the results of Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level. That is, we have first calculated family averages of all the variables. Column (5) and (6) are estimated in the same way as in Column (3), but the sample is based on the funds owned by life insurance companies and mutual fund families.
The results indicate that there is a strong positive relation between the average distance of the firms in which the fund invests and fund hierarchy. This holds across the different specifications as well as for different sub-samples. It also appears that the impact of the organizational structure on insurance firms is higher than mutual funds.
The results are not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. An increase of one layer in hierarchy raises the average distance (holding weighted distance) of the firms in which the fund invests by 6% (Column (2) of Panel B). This supports our first hypothesis (H1), showing that proximity investment is directly affected by the type of structure of the fund. If we consider the other variables, we see that being managed by a team or by a sole manager does not affect the decision to invest in closer firms. This suggests that our structure variables do not just proxy for the mere fact that a fund is team-managed.
The other control variables are consistent with intuition. Being located in a financial center increases the investment in closer firms. The same is true in the case the fund is more riskconscious and restricts itself to high-grade bonds. In the latter case, high risk prudence causes funds to shorten their investment distances.
It is also interesting to note that funds that rotate their portfolio a lot (i.e., "high-turnover" funds) are more likely to invest further away. This can be explained with the higher liquidity need of these funds, not easy to meet in a more limited local area. There is scarce evidence in favor of an impact of the degree of employee specialty.
As a further robustness check, for each fund, no matter whether it is single-hierarchy or multihierarchy, we match it with some other fund similar in type, geographical location and size, but different in terms of fund family and hierarchy. Then, we run regressions based on the differences between the original fund and the matched fund. The idea is that funds located closely are more likely to face a homogenous information set, and using differences, we can effectively cancel the unobservable factors away. The matching procedure is as follows: for each fund-quarter we first choose all the other funds of the same fund type but from different fund families and having different fund hierarchy. Then we pick 20 funds located most closely and narrow them down to 10 according to similarity in fund size. From those 10 funds we select the final one with the smallest geographical distances to the original fund. If there is more than one matched fund left meaning that they are located at the same place, we choose the most similar one in terms of fund size. All the variables except the financial center dummy, including both the dependent and independent variables, are the differences between the original fund and its matched peer. The results are reported in Panel E. We still find a strong positive relation between the difference in portfolio distances and the difference in fund hierarchy.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that one possible criticism of our measure of distance is that it measures the total distance that the fund in question resides from the bond issuers represented in the portfolio. However, it may be that that it is not total distance that matters but how many issuers are within a certain radius from this investor. We therefore also use an alternative approach in which we define a radius (300 km) and close bonds are the ones of the firms located within the radius and distant bonds the ones of the firms located outside the radius. We then assign a value of 0 to the close bonds and 1 to the distant ones. The (unreported) results based on this methodology are consistent with the reported ones.
Overall our findings hold across different specifications as well as for different sub-samples.
They also hold in the specification based on "differenced" variables with another similar fund located close-by. These findings show that proximity investment is directly affected by the type of structure of the fund. We now move on to see if fund hierarchy affects other portfolio strategies such as portfolio concentration and herding.
B. Organizational Structure and Portfolio Concentration
We now consider the impact of the organizational structure on portfolio concentration (H2). We know that the availability of more information induces the manager to tilt the portfolio towards the set of few assets over which he has more information (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2005) . We therefore expect that a more vertical hierarchy, by reducing the incentive to collect soft information, reduces the degree of portfolio concentration. Restriction H2 posits that funds characterized by a more hierarchical structure should display a lower degree of portfolio concentration.
As in the previous analysis, we start with some univariate statistics. First, we define our measure of portfolio concentration:
Herfin . It captures the degree of portfolio concentration in bonds of fund i at quarter t. If we denote the set of bond issues held by fund i by Q and t j i w , , be the fraction invested in bond issue j, fund herfindahl is
w Herfin . We then break down the sample into 4 different levels of hierarchy: from the lowest (1 layer) to the highest (4 layers).
In Table III , Panel A, we report the sample mean of fund portfolio concentration. We report the results for the original sample and the two matching samples described earlier as well as tests of fund portfolio differences in portfolio concentration between single and multi-fund hierarchy.
The results show a monotonic decrease in portfolio concentration as the number of layers increases.
This holds regardless of the sample. A four-layer fund tends to have a degree of concentration equal to just 26% (41% and 37%) of the concentration of a one-layer fund in the case of the overall sample (matching within family and matching across families).
We then employ a multivariate specification and estimate:
Herfin is the degree of portfolio concentration in bonds of fund i at quarter t, We report the results in Table III , Panel B for the entire sample. In Panels C and D, the sample is based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively and with the same specifications as in Panel B. Column (1) reports the results from an OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the fund level. In Column (2), we report the results of an IV regression, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. 3 The standard errors are clustered at the fund level. In Column (3), we provide Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while in Column (4), we provide the results of Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level.
Column (5) and (6) are estimated in the same way as in Column (3), but they are restricted to the funds managed by life insurance companies and mutual fund families. As in the previous specifications, in Panel E, the regressions are based on the difference in fund concentration and the difference in fund hierarchy between the original fund and another similar fund located close-by.
The matching procedure is the same as described before.
The results show a strong and consistent negative correlation between hierarchy and portfolio concentration. This holds across the different specifications (OLS, IV and Fama-MacBeth) as well as for the different sub-samples. An increase of one layer in the hierarchy reduces concentration by 48% (Column (2) of Panel B). The analysis based on the matching sample delivers consistent results. These findings support H2 and are consistent with the previous ones on proximity investment. They confirm an overall picture in which a more hierarchical structure reduces soft information collection. It is also interesting to note a strong negative correlation between the degree of employee specialty and portfolio concentration. This also holds across the different specifications (OLS, IV and Fama-MacBeth). An increase of one layer in the degree of specialty reduces concentration by 6% (Column (2) of Panel B).
Overall our findings show that the structure of the fund affects the degree of portfolio concentration. We now move on to herding.
C. Organizational Structure and Herding
We argued that a higher hierarchy would stifle fund managers' incentive to collect soft information and would induce them to invest more in line with their peers (H3). To address this issue, we study the relation between managerial herding and fund structure.
We define a variable (Herding i,t ) which proxies for the tendency of a fund to follow the trading behavior of its peers or to go against it. We employ the same methodology used by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) . A detailed description of the construction of this variable is reported in the section Variables Definitions at the end of the paper. In Panel B of Table I , we report some descriptive statistics of the measure of herding. The mean in our sample is 1.3%. It is higher than the findings of 0.84% by Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) . This can be seen as evidence that bond funds herd more with each other than equity funds.
We start with some univariate analysis. We break down the sample into 4 different levels of hierarchy: from the lowest (1 layer) to the highest (4 layers). We then report the sample mean of fund herding. We also provide univariate tests of fund herding regarding to single vs. multi-fund hierarchy. The results are reported in Table IV , Panel A. The results show a monotonic increase in fund herding propensity as the number of layers increases. This holds regardless of the sample. A four-layer fund tends to herd on average 51% (33% and 53%) more than a one-layer fund in the case of the overall sample (matching within family and matching across families).
We then move on to the multivariate analysis and estimate:
where Herding i,t represents the herding measure as defined above of fund i at quarter t,
Hierarchy is fund hierarchy and 1 , − t i X are other control variables. The other variables are defined as before. We include fund type dummies in all the specifications.
We report the results in Table IV , Panel B for the entire sample. In Panels C and D, the sample is based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively and with the same specifications as in Panel B. In Panel E, we report the results of the specification based on differences. We include funds owned by life insurance companies, mutual funds, property insurance companies and other institutions (annuities and pension funds). The layout of the columns is the same as in the previous analysis.
The results show a positive relation between hierarchy and herding. This holds across the different specifications as well as for different sub-samples. An increase of one layer in the hierarchy raises herding by 16% (Column (2) of Panel B). This is in line with H3. Hierarchy, by reducing the incentives to collect soft information, translates in more herding.
It is also interesting to note a negative relation between herding and the degree of employee specialty. An increase of one layer in the degree of employee specialty reduces herding by 12% (Column (2) of Panel B). In the case of employee specialty, the effect of reduction of risk taking is more than offset by the availability of more areas of specialty that increases the ability to beat the peers and therefore discourages herding. This would be consistent with the fund relying more on its private information because it has more areas of specialty available.
D. Organizational Structure and Performance
We now focus on performance. Restriction H4 posits that funds characterized by a less hierarchical structure deliver higher performance. To address this issue, we study the relation between performance and fund structure.
We start by defining the measure of performance ( Then, using the estimated loadings, we calculate fund alpha in month t by:
We start with some univariate analysis. We break down the sample into 4 different levels of hierarchy: from the lowest (1 layer) to the highest (4 layers). We then report the sample mean of fund alpha. We also provide univariate tests of difference in performance between single and multifund hierarchy. The results are reported in Table V , Panel A. They show a monotonic decrease in fund performance as the number of layers increases. This holds regardless of the sample. A fourlayer fund has a performance 41 bp (39 bp and 38 bp) lower than a one-layer fund in the case of the overall sample (matching within family and matching across families).
We them move on to the multivariate analysis and estimate:
alpha is fund performance,
Hierarchy is fund hierarchy and In the previous section, we found that hierarchy is negatively related to proximity investment.
We know that proximity investment is positively related to performance (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and 2001 , Chen et al., 2004 . Is it the case that the negative relationship between performance and hierarchy is just due to the lower proximity investment? To address this issue, in Panel B (column (7)- (10)) we include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the fund portfolio distance is below the sample median in each quarter and 0 otherwise, and we interact it with fund hierarchy and employee specialty. The interaction is always significantly negative for hierarchy. This suggests that for funds investing in close firms the negative impact of hierarchy is stronger and is consistent with wasting hard-to-transfer soft information.
If we consider the other variables, we notice the strong positive relation between performance and the fraction invested in high-quality bonds. This suggests that constraints on the ability to choose risky assets do not hamper performance. It is interesting to note that also the degree of specialty is significant and reduces performance. However, in this latter case, if we break the sample into mutual funds and insurance funds, we see that the result is mostly due to the insurance funds, while the effect on mutual funds is scarce.
Overall, these findings provide evidence of the "dark side" of the fund organizational structure: a negative relation between performance and hierarchy. We have argued that this is due to the fact that hierarchy slows the flow of information within the organization. If this is the case, we expect that most of the impact of hierarchy is concentrated in the investment in low quality bonds.
Indeed, these are the ones in which the lack of diffused and widespread information about the company makes soft information more relevant. For instance, soft information of the company which may result in a potential rating downgrade should matter more for low-quality bonds than for high quality bonds.
We test this issue, by studying whether the impact of hierarchy is more pronounced for the investment in high-quality bonds or for low-quality bonds. In particular, we indentify the "high rated bonds" in the fund portfolio and compare the impact of fund hierarchy on the fund performance of investing in high rated bonds with that of investing in low rated bonds. High rated bonds refer to bonds with Moody's credit rating above A3. Low rated bonds are bonds with Moody's credit rating from B3 to BBB1. For each fund, we estimate two portfolio alphas separately. The first is based on the value-weighted return of investing in high rated bonds, while the second is based on the return of investing in low rated bonds. Performance estimation is the same as the one defined above.
We report the results in Table V , Panel F. From Column (1) to Column (4) we stack the high and low rated alphas together and create a rating category dummy which equals 1 if it is a low rated alpha and 0 otherwise. Our focus is the interaction term of fund hierarchy and the rating category dummy. We also add the interaction of employee specialty and the rating category dummy as additional controls. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level (Column (1)) as well as at the family level (Column (2)). Column (3) and (4) are estimated in the same way as in Column (1) but only based on funds owned by life insurance companies and mutual fund families.
In Column (5) and (6) we run Fama-Macbeth regressions separately for the low rated alpha and the high rated alpha.
The results show that the strong negative correlation between performance and fund hierarchy is mostly concentrated in the low-rated bonds. This confirms our intuition that hierarchy mostly affects the flow of information mostly for low quality bonds. The interaction term of fund hierarchy and the low rating dummy of bond quality is always significant and negative. One additional layer of hierarchy reduces performance by 12 bp (Column (2) of Table V) more in the case of low quality bonds than for high quality bonds.
E. Robustness Checks
We now consider a robustness check. All the previous specifications are based on the relationship between hierarchy and fund behavior (portfolio concentration, herding, proximity investment) and performance. We now test whether the same specifications hold on changes. That is, we investigate whether changes in fund behavior and performance is related to a change in the degree of hierarchy of the fund. We therefore focus on the subsample (fund-quarter) where the fund changes its hierarchical structure from quarter t-1 to quartet t. We estimate the following regression:
where t , i ment FundManage ∆ represents the change in fund behavior (portfolio distance, herding, and portfolio concentration) as well as the change of fund performance. We consider two measures of performance: the raw return (cumulative, quarterly) of the fund and the change of fund alpha (cumulative, quarterly) respectively from quarter t -1 to quarter t. 
, i ment FundManage
− is the lagged dependent variable at quarter t-1. The standard errors are clustered at fund level and we always include time dummies and fund type (e.g., life insurance, property insurance, ..) dummies.
The results are reported in Table VI . They are consistent with the previous ones. An increase in the degree of hierarchy reduces proximity investment and portfolio concentration, while it raises fund herding. Overall, this implies a lower performance. These findings are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. An additional layer lowers the average distance from firms whose bonds it invests in by 25 km, reduces portfolio concentration by 5% and raises fund herding by 7%. It reduces fund performance by 14 bp in the case of raw returns and 23 bp in the case of alpha (quarterly). These results provide an additional robustness check. They also show that changes in the fund structure quickly find their way into the behavior of the fund managers.
V. Conclusion
We study how the internal organizational structure affects fund's strategies and performance. We focus mostly on mutual funds and insurance-managed funds. We argue that a more hierarchical structure reduces the incentives to collect "soft" information and proximity investment. This reduces the incentive to concentrate the investment in few bonds and makes the manager more likely to herd. The net result is lower performance.
We show that that funds with more hierarchical structures tend to invest less in firms located close to the funds. This has a direct negative effect on fund performance: more vertical structures are characterized by worse performance. Funds with a more vertical structure tend to herd more with the other funds and to hold less concentrated portfolios. We also find that changes in the fund structure quickly find their way into the behavior of the fund managers.
These findings are consistent with Stein's (2002) The number of specialties is counted as the number of total combinations of the above four sectors. Then we define employee specialty as the number of specialties divided by the number of employees.
Team Dummy
We define a team dummy equals 1 if the fund has more than 1 portfolio managers and 0 otherwise. .
Fund Herding
Fund Herding represents the tendency of a fund to "follow the crowd or to go against it". We follow the same methodology used by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) . The first step is to define a measure of investor herding at the bond level. Let 
is the proportion of funds trading issue-quarter k, t which are buyers. We use the proportion of all trades by funds that are purchases during quarter t to proxy for
. The first part represents the "extra" number of funds trading a bond issue during a given quarter as the proportion of the total number of funds buying that issue-quarter minus the expected proportion of buyers. The second term is an adjustment factor allowing for random variation around the expected proportion of buyers under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence among fund trades. The expectation in the second term is calculated by assuming that The second step is to define the signed herding measure (SHM) which indicates the tendency of whether fund i is following the crowd or going against it in trading bond k. This is calculated as:
is an indicator variable: 
where Pr(p) is the probability of ( ), the yield difference between the twenty-year constant maturity treasury bonds and the two-year constant maturity treasury bonds (gs20-gs2, term spread, TS), the yield difference between Moody's BAA corporate bond index and the thirty year constant maturity treasury bonds (Baa-gs30, risk spread, RS), the yield difference between the five year constant maturity treasury bonds and the average yield of two year and ten year constant maturity treasury bonds (gs5-(gs2+gs10)/2, curvature spread, CV), the excess return of market return over the risk-free rate ( (   1  ,  1  ,  1  ,  ,  ,  1  ,  1  ,  1  ,  1  ,  ,  , Panel A reports the sample mean of fund hierarchy and employee specialty characterizing fund structures. The detailed definitions can be found in the appendix. We separately report the results for mutual funds as well as funds managed by life insurance companies, property insurance companies and other institutions (annuities and pension funds). We construct two matching samples, one within fund family and one across fund families. The matching procedure is performed as follows. The "matching within fund family" sample is constructed as follows. For each multi-hierarchy fund, we first select another single hierarchy fund from the same fund family and most similar in terms of fund size, then combine the matched single hierarchy funds with the original multi-hierarchy funds. The "matching across fund families" sample is constructed similarly except that the matched single-hierarchy fund is chosen from different fund families but belonging to the same fund type (mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds etc.). Panel A1 is based on the full sample, while Panel A2 and Panel A3 are for the matching sample within and across fund families respectively. The number of observations (fund-quarter) is given in the parentheses. This table relates fund hierarchy to portfolio distance. Panel A summarizes the sample mean of fund portfolio distance at different levels of fund hierarchy. We also provide univariate tests of fund portfolio distance regarding to single vs. multi-fund hierarchy. Multi-hierarchy means the number of fund hierachies to be greater than 1. We consider the overall sample as well as the "matching within fund family" and the "matching across fund families". We report the results for the full sample and the two matching samples separately. Both two tailed T-test and Wilconxon rank-sum test are performed to test the differences. The number of observations (fund-quarter) is given in the parentheses. In Panels B-E, we report the results of the multivariate analysis. We estimate: The analysis in Panel B is based on the full sample. We add the fund type dummies across all specifications. Column (1) is based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustering at fund level. In Column (2), we report the results of an IV regression, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. Specifically, we instrument fund structure variables using the following variables: family hierarchy (median of fund hierarchy within a family), family emplolyee specialty (median of employee specialty within a family), family team (median of team dummy within a family), the interaction of family hierarchy with financial center dummy and the interaction of family employee specialty with financial center dummy. Hansen's J statistic (p-value) is reported to examine the quality of instruments. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. Column (3) provides Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while Column (4) provides the results of a Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level. Column (5) and (6) are estimated in the same way as in Column (3) but only based on funds owned by life insurance companies and mutual fund families. Panel C and Panel D are based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively with the same specifications as in PanelB.
Panel E uses a "differenced" variable approach, where for each fund we match it with some other fund similar in fund type, geographical location and size, but different in terms of fund family and fund hierarchy. The matching procedure is as follows: for each fund-quarter we first choose all the other funds of the same fund type but from different fund families and having different fund hierarchy. Then we pick 20 funds located most closely and narrow them down to 10 according to similarity in fund size. From those 10 funds we select the final one with the smallest geographical distances to the original fund. If there is more than one matched fund left meaning that they are located at the same place, we choose the most similar one in terms of fund size. All the variables except the financial center dummy, including both the dependent and independent variables, are the differences between the original fund and its matched peer.
For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of fund hierarchy from Panel C to Panel E. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-statistics given in parentheses. This table relates fund hierarchy to portfolio concentration. Panel A summarizes the sample mean of fund portfolio concentration at different levels of fund hierarchy. We also provide univariate tests of fund portfolio distance regarding to single vs. multi-fund hierarchy. Multi-hierarchy means the number of fund hierachies to be greater than 1. We consider the overall sample as well as the "matching within fund family" and the "matching across fund families". We report the results for the full sample and the two matching samples separately. Both two tailed T-test and Wilconxon rank-sum test are performed to test the differences. The number of observations (fund-quarter) is given in the parentheses. In Panels B-E, we report the results of the multivariate analysis. We estimate: The analysis in Panel B is based on the full sample. We add the fund type dummies across all specifications. Column (1) is based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustering at fund level. In Column (2), we report the results of an IV regression, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. Specifically, we instrument fund structure variables using the following variables: family hierarchy (median of fund hierarchy within a family), family emplolyee specialty (median of employee specialty within a family), family team (median of team dummy within a family), the interaction of family hierarchy with financial center dummy and the interaction of family employee specialty with financial center dummy. Hansen's J statistic (p-value) is reported to examine the quality of instruments. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. Column (3) provides Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while Column (4) provides the results of a Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level. Column (5) and (6) Panel E uses a "differenced" variable approach, where for each fund we match it with some other fund similar in fund type, geographical location and size, but different in terms of fund family and fund hierarchy. The matching procedure is as follows: for each fund-quarter we first choose all the other funds of the same fund type but from different fund families and having different fund hierarchy. Then we pick 20 funds located most closely and narrow them down to 10 according to similarity in fund size. From those 10 funds we select the final one with the smallest geographical distances to the original fund. If there is more than one matched fund left meaning that they are located at the same place, we choose the most similar one in terms of fund size. All the variables except the financial center dummy, including both the dependent and independent variables, are the differences between the original fund and its matched peer.
For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of fund hierarchy from Panel C to Panel E. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-statistics given in parentheses. This table related fund hierarchy to herding. Panel A summarizes the sample mean of fund herding at different levels of fund hierarchy. We also provide univariate tests of fund herding regarding to single vs. multi-fund hierarchy. Multi-hierarchy means the number of fund hierachies to be greater than 1. We consider the overall sample as well as the "matching within fund family" and the "matching across fund families". We report the results for the full sample and the two matching samples separately. Both two tailed T-test and Wilconxon rank-sum test are performed to test the differences. The number of observations (fund-quarter) is given in the parentheses. In Panels B-E, we report the results of the multivariate analysis. We estimate: The analysis in Panel B is based on the full sample. We add the fund type dummies across all specifications. Column (1) is based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustering at fund level. In Column (2), we report the results of an IV regression, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. Specifically, we instrument fund structure variables using the following variables: family hierarchy (median of fund hierarchy within a family), family employee specialty (median of employee specialty within a family), family team (median of team dummy within a family), the interaction of family hierarchy with financial center dummy and the interaction of family employee specialty with financial center dummy. Hansen's J statistic (p-value) is reported to examine the quality of instruments. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. Column (3) provides Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while Column (4) provides the results of a Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level. Column (5) and (6) are estimated in the same way as in Column (3) but only based on funds owned by life insurance companies and mutual fund families. Panel C and Panel D are based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively with the same specifications as in Panel B.
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For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of fund hierarchy from Panel C to Panel E. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-statistics given in parentheses. (1) is OLS regression with standard errors clustering at fund level. In Column (2), we have IV regressions, where family level structures are chosen as instruments. Specifically, we instrument fund structure variables using the following variables: family hierarchy (median of fund hierarchy within a family), family employee specialty (median of employee specialty within a family), family team (median of team dummy within a family), the interaction of family hierarchy with financial center dummy and the interaction of family employee specialty with financial center dummy. Hansen's J statistic (p-value) is reported to examine the quality of instruments. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. Column (3) provides Fama-Macbeth (1973) estimates at the fund level, while Column (4) provides the results of a Fama-Macbeth estimates at the family level. From Column (7) to Column (10) we add the interaction term of fund hierarchy and a "close investment" dummy. It equals 1 if the fund portfolio distance is below the sample median of the quarter and 0 otherwise. We also add the interaction term of employee specialty and close investment dummy as additional controls. Panel C and Panel D are based on the matching sample within and across fund families respectively. Panel E is based on the "differenced" variable as defined in the previous tables. For the sake of brevity we only report the coefficients of the fund hierarchy from Panel C to Panel E. In Panel F we compare the impact of fund hierarchy on the fund performance of investing in high rated bonds with that of investing in low rated bonds. High rated bonds refer to bonds with Moody's credit rating above A3. Low rated bonds are bonds with Moody's credit rating from B3 to BBB1. For each fund we estimate two portfolio alphas separately. One is based on the value-weighted return of investing in high rated bonds while the other is based on the return of investing in low rated bonds. The estimation procedure is the same as described in the appendix. From Column (1) to Column (4) we stack the high and low rated alphas together and create a rating category dummy which equals 1 if it is a low rated alpha and 0 otherwise. Our focus is the interaction term of fund hierarchy and the rating category dummy. We also add the interaction of employee specialty and the rating category dummy as additional controls. Standard erros are clustered at the fund level (Column (1)) as well as at the family level (Column (2)). Column (3) and (4) are estimated in the same way as in Column (1) but only based on funds owned by life insurance companies and mutual fund families. In Column (5) and (6) we run Fama-Mecbeth regressions separately for the low rated alpha and the high rated alpha.. ***, ** and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-statistics given in parentheses. 
